Aaaand the Washington Post is trying to boost its credibility with the Left, after being guilty of such horrible openmindedness and thoughtfulness as to hire people like Megan McArdle, by calling for an increase in the minimum wage.
Since 2009, the last time the national minimum wage was raised, there have been various and sundry studies about it, including a “very credible” 2017 study in Seattle saying that Seattle’s 2014 high increase in the M. W. hurt workers, which was so significant in its contribution to that field of study that the acolytes of Paul Krugman have been trying to talk down and blunt it ever since.
Now, there are lots of strong arguments against minimum wages. They’re price-fixing for labor, people say. They’re discriminatory against the kinds of businesses that employ minimum-wage workers. They spur automation, which kills that sort of job entirely. They hurt the poor that don’t have those jobs because they can no longer afford the new, higher prices of the product.
All of those arguments have a lot going for them. But today I’m criticizing a different aspect of minimum wages: the science being used to try to justify them. (Minimum wages need justification because labor is claimed to be an exception to the economic tenet that with most goods, price and demand vary inversely. Price the good higher and the market demands less.)
Put briefly and bluntly, the data suck. It’s the usual problems of social and economic scientific studies, which are that the data are usually limited in quantity and accuracy, and it’s sometimes a problem that they were often collected for other purposes, from what may have been an unrepresentative group of people, using assumptions and definitions other than those of the study. This being the case, there is also usually no way for there to be a reliable control group. This is a really major flaw, because significant political pressure is on this study from both sides. Not only does it mean that there are a myriad of opportunities for biased scientists to p-hack (that is, to set the study’s parameters according to which ones appear to validate the conclusion that the scientist wants) but it provides opportunities for people that want to justify mild increases in the minimum wage, which used to be the only politically possible move anyway. Look, they used to say, mild increases in the minimum wage don’t hurt the economy! (Although nowadays, they substitute ad hominem attacks upon Republicans in lieu of the adjective.)
What wasn’t possible politically to say is that the data we have are too crude to be able to discern the lower levels of economic damage. But it’s telling that the places where high minimum wages are being offered are places like Seattle, San Francisco and New York that have strong economies for reasons unrelated to industries with minimum wages. Hey, let’s test a medicine’s effectiveness without regard to the age and overall health of the patient!
Medicine is actually a good area for economic metaphor, because of the parallels of the human body with the human economy in complexity and in our difficulty collecting data deep enough to really tell us what’s going on. Many times when people have diseases, their experience of the diseases are “subclinical”, meaning that their symptoms are so mild that the person with the disease doesn’t feel them. The damage of slight increases to minimum wages to strong economies are, similarly, subclinical. Not Quite Seen, in the Bastiatic sense. The damage they do to those economies is very real, but the number of dollars flowing into those cities from Silicon Valley, or Wall Street, simply swamp the already-crude information we have about that damage. Prosperity skews the null hypothesis wildly.
I’ve been thinking a good deal about how inefficient the events of the past few years have made politics seem.
Brexit was a major example. To try, finally, to quell the political movement that argued for leaving the European Union, they allowed people to express themselves directly on the question, quite certain that they knew the answer already. Certainly they were shocked to discover the inefficiency of their information-gathering on how people felt when Leave won by a four-point gap. But I think the inefficiency-discovering hasn’t ended. I think there are undiscovered effects of our societal wealth upon politics. Let me illustrate.
Back in January Megan McArdle wrote that the best solution to Brexit would be “leave, good and hard”, a reference to H. L. Mencken’s famous quote that “Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it, good and hard”. “For the record,” McArdle wrote, “I think the outcome of Brexit is likely to be quite unhappy for Britain and for the ‘Leave’ voters who expect it to improve their lives.”
But Henry Louis Mencken coined that saying over a century ago (in 1916’s A Little Book in C Major), when, to take a few major examples, food was a much higher percentage of a household’s budget and most people had no car (as opposed to today’s ponderings about whether we’ve reached “peak car”) or electronic entertainment. Society was much less wealthy. As I’ve also argued, it’s societal wealth– the number of hours needed to work to acquire the basics to live– that pushes people further up Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. How much increase in the cost of living, then, is needed to lower them down again to the point where they suffer? It’s rather surprising that McArdle, who is one of the rare observers of today’s world who can usually be counted on to ask, “How much?” and “When?” rather than merely “What?” did not ask them here. She did not question the assumption of elite policy-setters that tariffs will cause the cost of living to increase so much that ordinary dwellers in the United Kingdom will a.) notice and b.) decide that on average, it wasn’t worth trading it for regaining control over their own borders and affairs.
They certainly might do both, though elites underestimated the degree to which the latter is a retail issue for people, not a luxury issue. Where I differ from the columnist is that I see no reason to assume it. Overall, politicians still don’t know about the majority of things that people care about, much less how much they care about each. We are wallowing so much in a sea of billions of people, tens of billions of their degrees of opinion, and trillions of dollars, that no one has a very good idea what’s going on. People vote with their feet, they vote with their pocketbooks, and the tiny minority who answer polling calls vote with their answers to prephrased questions, leaving politicians looking like anthropologists trying to use the archaeological record to figure out mating rituals among the ancient Aztecs. And in turn, people don’t know or care about the vast majority of the actions that government takes, and you can’t argue to voters that they’ll miss something you’ve done that they hadn’t even realized existed.
How cheap things are explains a lot of this. There’s a sort of marginal utility to cheapness, a point of diminishing returns past which the increase in the value people put on cheapness is lower and lower in terms of political significance. This works in both directions of wealth. The tariffs involved in Brexit and the trade hardball that Donald Trump has been playing with Mexico and China will cause the price of goods to rise, but it is going to take a while before people feel it enough to alter their political behavior. Trash cans and thrift stores are alike swamped with secondhand but still perfectly useable goods. These goods are like a folk heuristic for the cost of living; they’re a measure of slack in the economic line. How many fewer cargo containers of cheap goods will the U.K. be able to afford before its citizens notice? Maybe not that many, but how many before they value cheap things more than sovereignty and democracy? Hopefully, politicians will be paying close attention to the answer to that question.
So, here we go again with another musing about the moving parts of that weird alloy of capitalism and socialism that we live in, modern Western democracy.
The Relationship Between Politics and Idealism
One thing which is rarely even mentioned, let alone discussed, is the relationship between politics and idealism.
The value of social and moral activists to political parties is of course partially the value of their votes. But part of the value is that they supply idealistic clothing to disguise the naked fights over power and money. Political parties cling to their justifications too long and too hard. The Democrats have been fighting racism, sexism, et cetera for a long, long time– long enough for the struggle to shift from a process to a pillar of their identity, their worldview. This is what happens with ideas that have enough juice. The Left appears never to have considered what they would do if they actually achieved what they ostensibly wanted, which appears to be the case: racism and sexism have never been rarer than they are today in America and Europe. They’re far more common in the rest of the world. True, the activists of the Democrats have come up with some new stablemates for these tired old nags, in the form of homophobia, transphobia and so on, but given the arguments about the terms, the relative scarcity of the pitiable people in question, and (unlike race and gender) the concealability of the defining characteristic in many cases, it’s doubtful that they’ll ever be the workhorses that race and sex were.
So. Faced with the unpleasant fact that you won, and might no longer have that sweet political and identity-narrative juice going forward, what do you do?
Give them up?
The Democratic Party won’t permit that.
Any political party or politician (Republicans included) needs idealism not only for the activist energy and votes, but to disguise the uglier aspects of their party. Poor Democrats require a veil over the fact that much of their proffered pitiability is little more than the intellectualization of greed of foolish people who are in the lower half of the distribution when it comes to talent, brains or capitalist ability, and/or in the upper half when it comes to spending money on lifestyle. The unaffordability by the government of poor people’s greed must likewise be concealed. They have to have obfuscation and obscurantism over the fact that the expedience of voting yourself money is an addiction which often never ends (and which, like addiction, requires more and more over time as the system acclimates). Find new idealism, or fix the old? Nah. They’re too addicted to the “quicker, easier, more seductive” path of clinging to the old idealism, poorly fitting though it now is.
So if they can’t give stale idealism up or reform it, just as Christianity could not for so long, what can they do?
Only one thing.
Move the goalposts. Redefine them. Do the new definitions fit the real world poorly? Scream and rage at those pointing it out, since righteousness has its own energy, cheap and corrosive though it is.
Ralph Waldo Emerson saw this sort of rot of idealism. In his most famous essay he wrote,
“Well, most men have bound their eyes with one or another handkerchief, and attached themselves to some one of these communities of opinion. This conformity makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four not the real four; so that every word they say chagrins us, and we know not where to begin to set them right. Meantime nature is not slow to equip us in the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere. We come to wear one cut of face and figure, and acquire by degrees the gentlest asinine expression.”
The Guardian has a worthless glop of an article about Siri and Alexa, which they sum up as, “Virtual assistants such as Google Home and Siri only encourage the attitude that women exist merely to aid men in getting on with more important things.”
I mention this because it appears to me to be the perfect illustration of the core idea that lies behind everything wrong with the Left today. That core idea is essentially Marxist anthropology, the ideas about human beings that Karl Marx relied upon in his deeply failed ideology. Its application here is a bone-deep belief that human beings are extremely conditionable, and therefore that everything can be chopped up into micro-factors that tend in one direction or the other.
A billion times, no.
The thing about NeverTrumpers is that there is no Leftist equivalent.
I know that’s kind of an odd statement, but I’ll try to explain.
NeverTrumpers are a bit like Cincinnatus, or George Washington. “People who are defined by what they are not willing to do to have power” makes it sound as though I am complimenting them. It makes them sound noble, and in some sense they are. Only superficially, though. They aren’t surrenderers of much power themselves. Washington was powerful and popular and could have been king, and his alternative, the beautiful vision for which he established the precedent of peaceful transfers of American power, was the establishment of real democracy, even though it would mean the election, inevitably, of hacks, and the enactment of folly. The NeverTrumpers are only giving up mainstream conservative intellectual status, and not for a beautiful and farsighted vision, but to avoid the re-evaluation of their worldview in the face of shocking evidence of its incompleteness. What they are willing to do is to go back to a pre-2016 situation that amounted to a pack of Mean Girls eating their lunch every day, with compromise, back when such a thing existed, amounting to the Left getting what it wanted only slightly more slowly than its intellectual Young Turks could imagine it.
The Left, too, avoids the re-evaluation of their priors; it’s a human tendency. But they still aren’t similar to the Right in the main way I am talking about. During no Democratic administration has there ever been any analogue on the Left to NeverTrumpers. I can name no time when any significant and prominent component of the Left has visibly refused to go along with some clear moral dilemma to have power. I can think of no time when they have said, “We want this policy, but this one thing standing in the way that we have the power to get rid of– this part of the Constitution, this pillar of the Rule of Law, the idea of the loyalty of the Loyal Opposition– is too important to sacrifice.” If they have, it happened in private.
Public or private, the Left is willing to have unity at the cost of the society-poisoning whiny viciousness of victim politics and social media mobbing. They’re willing to condone the hounding out of office of an executive who, far from even saying anything, had merely donated to a cause opposing gay marriage, or the ruination of bakers and pizza-makers for insisting upon their right not to associate. They stoop to claiming, in essence, that hurt feelings are on a par with lynching. They have originated and nourished the idea that foolishness and poor decisions by teenagers are a matter not for a serious discussion and a teachable moment among adults, between the people in question and the people whose feelings were hurt, but for the ruining of lives and decades’ worth of work long after the emigration from the foreign country of the past. These moral dilemmas lack the personification of a President, but they are none the less equivalent in significance, if not greater, and the Left stands guilty in the spotlight.
By and large, the Left’s capacity for rationalization appears almost completely unfettered, a seemingly infinite intellectualizing force for amoral expedience. NeverTrumpers and the Left are alike in appearing to be unable or unwilling to see that the Left itself caused the pressures on the Right to come up with whatever seems necessary to counteract it. To the Right– and to me– the Left winning and getting to terraform the United States is not acceptable– full stop. NeverTrumpers are like seated passengers on Flight 93 cautioning the chargers of the cockpit to fight fair.
The angst-y topic of the week for conservatives and Republicans appears to be over the future of the party, with Trumpers and NeverTrumpers at odds like Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.
Megan McArdle recently wrote about NeverTrumpers:
“Yet as the party heads into 2020 with Trump still very much at the helm, a number of people are beginning to ask an obvious question: “What’s the point?” Conservative resistance hasn’t ousted Trump; all it’s done is split the movement. So as political scientist and RealClearPolitics writer Sean Trende recently asked in a Twitter thread, what is the end game for the dedicated holdouts?”
McArdle explains problems with each of Trende’s three possibilities.
- Conceding defeat, she says, “means abandoning your dearest principles — and if you think the Trump administration is likely to end in some combination of disaster or corruption scandals, it means positioning yourself to be splattered by the fallout.”
- She says that “in practice there’s little benefit” to positioning yourself as the loyal opposition. “Liberals will identify you with all of Trump’s worst excesses, while the Party of Trump will regard you as a fifth columnist.”
- Pursuing active insurgency “means sacrificing any realistic chance of retaking the helm of the party,” says McArdle, in paraphrase of Trende. She continues: “If you have been actively working to nuke Trump’s presidency, then if you succeed — or even if external events do the job for you — you can be sure that your faction will be the one group not chosen to rebuild the party out of the rubble.”
The second of these seems easily the best to me. Liberals will identify conservatives who choose that with Trump’s excesses, sure, but then again, they’ll do that anyway. Expecting rationality, fairness and consistency out of the Left these days is a fool’s errand; they often appear a breath’s worth of rationalization away from doing anything they please. The Party of Trump will regard you as a fifth columnist? Well, no– a fifth column is almost definitionally a secret organization of fellow-travelers. They may regard you as “cucks”– a word I hate, incidentally, and not least because it’s used ad infinitum, ad nauseam— but you have to stand for what you stand for, and once their ambition is tempered and the laws the Left proposes to put in place next time they get into power are seen clearly enough to be feared, they may come back.
But my reaction would be to reject this trichotomy.
Politics is a lot like capitalism, in being a system intended in part to produce information about what people desire and how much. Both systems are often distorted. In capitalism, for example, the ethanol tax credit ruins the data about how much people actually want ethanol, while in politics, the Commission on Presidential Debates skews information about how much people might like the Libertarian or Green parties’ platforms by keeping their candidates out of the debates. As I’ve argued, politics steers idealism as much as the other way around. The marketplace of ideas was turned to the private benefit of a pretty cozy group of politicians, bureaucratic mandarins and cultural influencers. They steered people away from issues that were uncomfortable or politically unprofitable or economically crazy. This is one way of avoiding bad policies, it’s true. But distorting the marketplace of ideas that way leads to a distorted picture of what people want, and how much.
So. What use is all this talk of unaddressed issues to a NeverTrumper trying to figure out what to do?
Well, we’ve come about to the limits of the set of policies that elites put together back in the 1980s and 1990s that Fukuyama called “the end of history”– the seemingly perfect equation of free trade producing greater societal wealth, producing (I argue) greater capacity in people for social liberalism. No one thought the equation of this capacity was a hyperbola, so that you could reach a point of diminishing returns of marginal utility to people of ever-cheaper goods and services. No one knew saw that there was eventually so much market for the ideas that elites of both parties quietly agreed to ignore and backburner– such as nationalism, immigration, the Savonarola-like extremes of identity politics, and a desire by poorer people not for handouts, but for meaningful work and dignity– that it could flood past the cultural and professional gatekeepers (who were in any case weakened by technological change). The real question dividing Trumpers and NeverTrumpers is the same dividing Pelosi Democrats from Bernie Democrats: What issues will the parties stand for going forward?
That, then, is the question that NeverTrumpers should ask. To date, NeverTrumpers and Pelosi Democrats have seemed united in thinking that “true conservatism” and “true liberalism” means positions only on the set of issues that they confined themselves to since about 1990 or so, and adherence to the worldview that self-justified ignoring other issues. McArdle mentions that Jonah Goldberg argues that NeverTrumpers should keep fighting Trump simply to “do the right thing” (her paraphrase). I like Jonah Goldberg, but honestly, a better euphemism for doubling down on one’s worldview, a worldview which saw none of this coming, is hard to imagine. The wiser course would be to triangulate and try to see how one’s previous worldview was mistaken and which policies beloved of Trumpers they can come to terms with. Remember that there is no other way to turn a stampede than to take the lead.
Trende’s question really amounts to one about repairs to the broken Overton Window— whether Trump’s voters will, even after their perceived best hope of realizing them is gone, surrender the issues that 2016 liberated or the ambition that Trump awoke. It seems clear that they will not. McArdle has often written about path dependence. We are now in the middle of it. If NeverTrumpers want to get rid of the man– and I can certainly understand that– I think they’re going to have to surrender the hope of controlling the issues, and instead begin the work of finding someone who can convince the Republican base that he or she can be as effective as Trump has been, without Trump’s manifold flaws, excrescences and sins.
TL; DR: The issues that Trump’s supporters wanted to talk about are not going away, so NeverTrumpers should adjust accordingly.
“I should like to consider the folk song, and expound briefly on a theory I have held for some time, to the effect that the reason most folk songs are so atrocious is that they were written by the people.” — Tom Lehrer
I too have a theory that I’ve held for some time, that I’d also like to expound briefly on.
It is this: that economic conservatives and social liberals are natural allies, despite usually appearing in the platforms of the two main opposing parties, as are economic liberals with social conservatives.
Why is this?
Because more than anything else, social liberalism correlates with societal wealth, in the sense of cheapness of goods relative to your income. In the fulsome, fatuous old Victorian phrase, if you can take care of the basics– food, warmth, shelter, entertainment– your mind “turns to higher things”. Or if you’re like me and prefer more modern formulations (and mixed metaphors, which are goofy fun), it would be that a rising tide lifts all boats higher up on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
That, of course, is only half of it. The other half is that economic liberalism in large quantities– the ability and inclination of voters to vote themselves someone else’s money– kills economies. Always. Like strychnine or nitroglycerin, which in small amounts are useful (as appetite inducer and heart stimulant, respectively), that which is fine in small amounts is fatal in large quantities. (Sola dosis facit venenum, as Paracelsus said.) The most isolated such economies offer the most vivid examples, such as Venezuela, where the societal wealth, the cheapness of goods, has vanished.
Thus it is that unrestrained economic liberalism kills the societal wealth that allows social liberalism to flourish. Venezuela has never been anyone’s idea of Berkeley, but surely it must be an even more socially conservative place right now. Single-minded social conservatives should therefore want less societal wealth. None are that single-minded, of course, but for the reason that is at the core of my theory, and which is at the core of many political problems: economic desires frequently conflict with social desires. In this case, the strong support of conservatives for economic freedom hinders their desire for social conservatism, by creating the wealth that enables people to be more socially liberal.
I want to talk today about a major problem with idealism and activism. This is not partisan. It’s true about human beings in general, both on the Left and on the Right, and between. It’s about causes, and powers.
Causes adopt whatever tools, whatever powers, they think are necessary to succeed– which also must be available, of course, and which the cause has no qualms about using. This is a pretty straightforward and non-controversial statement, right?
Now, it’s a curious way of looking at it, but causes, and powers, have an odd symbiotic relationship. Power for its own sake is an actor too. It wants to continue to get to act and to be powerful. Causes use the powers to try to win, of course. But powers, in turn, use the causes to justify themselves. People who enjoy exercising powers use the causes, the idealism, to defend themselves from rational attacks upon the use of the power for its own sake.
What happens, though, when the causes succeed? An imbalance. A cause is an argument, a push, for a different “normal”. When causes succeed, they commit suicide. Or, if you prefer, pupate. A successful cause is no longer a cause. Revolutions metamorphose into institutions. The new institution is now reality, for other causes—including, in activist revanchism, the cause of the old reality—to push against.
Where, then, does that leave the powers which were so codependent with the cause? The powers, reluctant to find a new rationalizing cause unless absolutely forced to, push the idea that the cause has not actually succeeded. Communism has not actually been vanquished. Satan’s wiles are eternal. The enemies of Peace, Justice and Freedom (TM) are neverending. Sound familiar? There’s always some new way people can argue that the cause’s goals haven’t actually been achieved, so that they continue to get to exercise the powers despite opposition both from the outside and in their own consciences. They redefine the goals. They redefine the words. They demonize questioners. And over time, the tail wags the dog. Power for its own sake becomes the driving force, with a veneer of idealism as combined camouflage and shield.
This risk is age-old and perennial. Charities, especially those publicized and popularized by the media in some form, become brands, and brands get put to use to become major businesses. The CEOs of major charities get paid six figures.
Here’s an example. The cause founded by Father Flanagan, in Omaha in 1917– Boys Town, to care for orphans– was popularized by a 1938 movie with Spencer Tracy. By the 1960s it had become a major charity hog, with far more money coming in than was necessary to care for the pretty small number of orphans under its care.
The Monsignor was asked why they were constantly fundraising.
“We’re so deep in debt all the time,” he said.
Which was, needless to say, untrue to a shocking degree. Its net worth was in fact over two hundred million dollars. It took Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalism by the Omaha Sun to break this major scandal in 1973, forcing the power to stop feeding itself so much and to return the focus to the cause.
Here’s a second example.
Not long before the Sun won its Pulitzer, one Morris Dees, whose marketing genius had made him a millionaire, founded the Southern Poverty Law Center. It was a good cause which did good work, such as supplying lawyers to poor Southern people on Death Row, and integrating all-white institutions. The Ku Klux Klan was its main ostensible opponent– and main moneymaker. Before long, though, the tail began to wag the dog, just like with Boys Town.
An article by Ken Silverstein in Harper’s Magazine in 2000 explained how this all worked. The SPLC went after the Klan, two of whose members had lynched a black boy, and they sued it for everything it had. News stories gushed about the great victory and $7 million judgment– but the only asset the KKK had was a warehouse worth about $50,000, so it seems pretty likely the rest of the judgment was never paid. No word on what the lawyers were paid, but the SPLC got about $9 million in donations.
Nor did it stop. “One pitch, sent out in 1995– when the Center had more than $60 million in reserves– informed would-be donors that the ‘strain on our current operating budget is the greatest in our 25-year history’.” The priest in charge of Boys Town thirty years earlier couldn’t have put it any better. Spin and pitiability were the name of the game.
This is a major form of the corruption of rationality. Hollywood indulges (wallows? revels?) in what has become known as “Hollywood Accounting”– the practice of using accounting rules to make it seem as though a movie has made very little actual profit. (Suckers are willing to take a portion of net profits; those in the know demand a portion of gross receipts, which puts them at the top of the cash flow statement and avoids the bullshit further down.) In a similar way, major, unionized, labor-intensive companies, back in the day when there were many, were owned in truth far more by the workers than by the theoretical owners. How’s that? Well, the true owners of an asset are those that control it, that get the profits from it. Unions were able to keep voting themselves more and more of the profits in the form of what were supposedly increases to salary and benefits– an added portion of gross receipts. They were far more the true owners than the nominal owners, the shareholders, who got whatever was left after unions were done, and their “raises” were in fact de facto dividends that were called wage increases by Hollywood-style accounting.
Major charities, like Boys Town or the SPLC, are no different. Nominally, they’re non-profit. In truth, what that often means is that the profits have been Hollywood-accounted away. They’ve been channeled into extra salaries and benefits, bloated leases on trophy headquarters, and the like. They are, in essence, powers camouflaged with ideology that isn’t permitted to fade away or adapt to deal with changing problems.
So as you can see, causes and powers have an uneasy relationship. Political power frequently steers idealists toward the politically profitable potential solutions to the problems they’re idealistic about, and away from the politically unprofitable ones. By degrees, sadly, the idealists come up with their own Just-So Stories about it and cease to realize that they’re being managed.
The Left’s answer to Trump, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, has released a deeply stupid document she refers to as a “Green New Deal”, in which she sets forth various pie-in-the-sky schemes. Megan McArdle describes them: “replacing air travel with high-speed rail; junking every automobile with an internal-combustion engine; making affordable public transportation available to every single American (presumably including those who live hours from the nearest town?); replacing the electric grid with something smarter; meeting “100% of power demand through clean and renewable energy sources”; and — I swear I’m not making this up — providing economic security to people who are “unwilling to work.” This, too, is supposed to happen within only a decade, or thereabouts.”
“But,” McArdle remarks, “arguably Ocasio-Cortez’s team wasn’t really trying to put together a practical document. Rather, it articulates an ideal, one that we may never reach but should at least strive for. And there’s something appealing about that argument, because climate change is a pressing concern, and even if it weren’t, there would be ample reasons to want to obtain as much energy as possible from renewable sources.”
There’s actually nothing appealing about that argument, simply because we shouldn’t encourage its ocean-wide disconnect from various aspects of reality. Electric cars and high-speed rail (also electric) still have to produce the energy somewhere. (My arguments for nuclear power will be a different post; suffice it to say here that there’s no rationality to any carbon-reduction plan that does not begin with a massive expansion of nuclear power.) With regard to home energy efficiency, It would save only a little of the fraction of U.S. energy consumed by heating, of the fraction of U.S. energy consumed by domestic use, of the 14% of worldwide carbon emissions produced by the U.S., which is in turn only thought to be responsible for about one-quarter of climate change. All of it together can only be done once and is probably going to save only the equivalent of a year or two of the carbon increase produced by population growth in China and India.
And that’s before the minor matter of its cost. If you could wave a wand and get all these things tomorrow at a zero cost in financial and/or political terms, the logic would be, “Sure, why not? Every little bit helps.” Instead, this smidgen would cost massively in all respects and be deeply unpopular with the public, with the result that it’s a political nonstarter. Trying to do it anyway would waste enormous amounts of the one thing the claimers of climate Armageddon argue we have far less of than we think: time.
So, no, in my view, not appealing.